

Supreme Court, U. S.

FILED

DEC 29 1977

IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES <sup>MICHAEL</sup> DAK, JR., CLERK

October Term, 1977

NO. 77-931

R. J. Kunkle, d/b/a R. J. Restoration  
Co., Petitioner

v.

Arthur Eggleston, Respondent

---

Petition for a Writ of Certiorari  
to the Ohio Supreme Court

Counsel for Petitioner  
E. Bruce Hadden  
JONES, CAMPBELL  
& HADDEN  
500 West Wilson  
Bridge Road  
Worthington, OH 43085

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IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES

October Term, 1977

No. \_\_\_\_\_

R. J. Kunkle, d/b/a R. J. Restoration  
Co., Petitioner

v.

Arthur Eggleston, Respondent

Petition for a Writ of Certiorari  
to the Ohio Supreme Court

The Petitioner R. J. Kunkle prays  
that a Writ of Certiorari issue to review  
the Journal Entry of the Ohio Supreme  
Court refusing to hear the Petitioner's  
appeal from the Judgment entered by the  
Court of Appeals, Tenth Appellate District  
of Ohio. Said Journal Entry was entered  
on September 29, 1977.

OPINIONS BELOW

The judgment of Circuit Court of

Daviess County, Indiana is attached in the Appendix at page 19. The opinions of the Common Pleas Court of Franklin County, State of Ohio, are unreported and are attached in the Appendix as follows: Journal Entry and Decision (Appendix, page 24); Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law (Appendix, page 26). The opinions of the Tenth District Court of Appeals, Franklin County, State of Ohio, are unreported and are attached in the Appendix as follows: on original argument (Appendix, page 31); on Motion for Reconsideration (Appendix, page 39). There were no opinions rendered by the Ohio Supreme Court. Its Journal Entry denying the Petitioner's Motion to Certify entered on September 29, 1977 is attached to this Petition in the Appendix at page 46.

#### JURISDICTION

The judgment of the Ohio Supreme Court denying the Petitioner's Motion to Certify the record was entered on September 29, 1977. The jurisdiction of this Court is invoked under 28 U.S.C., §1257(3).

#### QUESTIONS PRESENTED

Respondent procured an in personam judgment against Petitioner in an Indiana State Court. The Indiana State Court judgment disclosed on its face that Petitioner was not offered an opportunity to appear and defend, (i.e., the judgment was rendered automatically without service of process on Petitioner) and there was no determination by the Indiana State Court that procedural due process prerequisites to afford jurisdiction over an Ohio resident not served with process in

Indiana had been satisfied.

The Ohio Courts, while granting full faith and credit to the Indiana judgment which was neither offered nor admitted into evidence, also refused to subject the Indiana judgment to any procedural or substantive due process standards.

The Questions Presented are:

1. Whether an Indiana Court may enter an in personam judgment against an Ohio resident neither served with process nor offered an opportunity to appear and defend prior to judgment.
2. Whether an Ohio Court may give full faith and credit to an in personam Indiana State Court judgment that is neither offered nor admitted into evidence and which judgment

discloses on its face that Petitioner was denied the opportunity to appear and defend.

#### CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS AND STATUTES INVOLVED

Constitution of the United States,  
Amendment V.

"No person shall be \*\*\* deprived of life, liberty, or property, without due process of law; \*\*\*."

Constitution of the United States,  
Amendment XIV, Section 1.

"\*\*\*nor shall any State deprive any person of life, liberty, or property, without due process of law; nor deny to any person within its jurisdiction the equal protection of the laws."

#### STATEMENT OF THE CASE

1. On October 29, 1974 a Complaint

was filed in the Franklin County Common Pleas Court alleging Respondent recovered a judgment in the Circuit Court of Daviess County, Indiana.

Attached to that Complaint was a copy of the alleged judgment of the Circuit Court of Daviess County and a copy of the alleged award of the Industrial Board of Indiana.

2. On or about December 2, 1974 Petitioner filed his answer admitting that he is a resident of Franklin County, Ohio, denying the remaining factual assertions of the Complaint and asserting procedural and substantive due process defenses.
3. On February 17, 1976 the case was submitted to the Court on

the pleadings, trial briefs and no evidence other than the Stipulation of counsel that the Respondent was hired by the Petitioner in Ohio and then went to Indiana.

4. The Ohio Trial Court entered a judgment in favor of Respondent.
5. The Court of Appeals affirmed Trial Court's judgment.
6. The Supreme Court of Ohio refused to certify record.

#### REASONS FOR GRANTING THE WRIT

1. An Indiana Court may not enter an *in personam* judgment against an Ohio resident without ascertaining that the minimum contacts prerequisites enunciated in International

Shoe Co. v. Washington, 326  
U.S. 310, 66 S.Ct. 154, 90  
L.Ed. 95 (1945), have been  
satisfied.

The Indiana State Court judgment  
(Appendix, page 19) discloses on its  
face that Petitioner was neither served  
with process nor offered an opportunity  
to appear and defend before judgment was  
rendered against him.

"Comes now Arthur  
Eggleson, by counsel, and  
having filed herein his  
Petition for Judgment upon  
a decision and order of The  
Industrial Board of Indiana,  
which said petition is in  
the words and figures, as  
follows:

(H.I.)

And the Court, having  
read and examined said  
petition and the matters  
and facts filed therewith  
and set forth therein and  
being duly advised in the  
premises, NOW FINDS that a  
certified copy of said  
decision and order of The

Industrial Board of Indiana  
was duly issued by said  
board and filed herein;  
that said petition should be  
granted; and that judgment  
should be entered and ren-  
dered by this Court in ac-  
cordance with said decision  
and order of said industrial  
board and that notice of  
said judgment should be  
given to the parties, \*\*\*."

In International Shoe, supra, this  
Court established the jurisdictional pre-  
requisites to an in personam judgment  
against a nonresident defendant.

"\*\*\*due process requires only  
that in order to subject a  
defendant to a judgment in  
personam, if he be not present  
within the territory of the  
forum, he have certain minimum  
contacts with it such that the  
maintenance of the suit does  
not offend 'traditional notions  
of fair play and substantial  
justice.' \*\*\*" (Citations  
omitted) 326 U.S. 316, 90 L.Ed.  
102.

The mandates of International Shoe,  
supra, have been applied to both natural

persons and corporations. McGee v. International Life Insurance Company, 355 U.S. 220, 78 S.Ct. 199, 2 L.Ed.2d 223 (1957).

In Shaffer v. Heitner, 53 L.Ed.2d 682, 95 S.Ct. 2569 (1977), this Court extended the minimum contacts standards of International Shoe, supra, to in rem actions. This Court determined:

"\*\*\*the relationship among the defendant, the forum, and the litigation, rather than the mutually exclusive sovereignty of the States on which the rules of Pennoyer rest, became the central concern of the inquiry into personal jurisdiction. \*\*\*" 53 L.Ed.2d 698.

In the case now before this Court, the Indiana Court had no jurisdiction to render an in personam judgment against the Petitioner. Absent evidence that the judgment obtained in Indiana was rendered pursuant to the Indiana Court's

obtaining personal jurisdiction over the Petitioner, its judgment against the Petitioner is void, fails to satisfy minimum procedural and substantive due process requirements and is not entitled to full faith and credit by the Ohio Courts. Hanson v. Denckla, 357 U.S. 235, 78 S.Ct. 1228, 2 L.Ed.2d 1283 (1958).

2. Petitioner was deprived of his property in violation of the due process clause of the Fourteenth Amendment by the Ohio Courts' granting full faith and credit to the in personam Indiana State Court judgment.

A judgment obtained without procedural due process in one state is not entitled to the full faith and credit in a sister state. Griffin v. Griffin,

327 U.S. 220, 66 S.Ct. 556, 90 L.Ed. 635 (1945), rehearing denied 327 U.S. 220, 90 L.Ed. 1645 (1946). The due process clause of the Fourteenth Amendment requires that at a minimum any deprivation of life, liberty or property must be preceded by notice and an opportunity for hearing Griffin v. Griffin, supra, and Boddie v. Connecticut, 401 U.S. 371, 91 S.Ct. 780, 28 L.Ed.2d 113 (1971).

Entering a judgment that imposes penalties on persons or deprives them of life, liberty or property without adequate notice and an opportunity to defend is also a denial of due process.

Shelley v. Kraemer, 334 U.S. 1, 68 S.Ct. 836, 92 L.Ed. 1161 (1947).

There was no evidence that the Indiana Court served the Petitioner with process in Indiana, served the Petitioner with process in Ohio or afforded

Petitioner the opportunity to appear and defend prior to rendering judgment against Petitioner. The Petitioner is entitled to notice and an opportunity to a hearing on the merits prior to the entering of a personal judgment against him. Without having been given this opportunity, the Petitioner is now subject to a substantial personal judgment, and it is appropriate for this Court to resolve the Petitioner's rights not to have his property interests taken from him without due process of law.

#### CONCLUSION

For these reasons, a Writ of Certiorari should issue to review the

judgment of the Ohio Supreme Court.

Respectfully submitted,



Counsel for Petitioner

E. Bruce Hadden  
JONES, CAMPBELL & HADDEN  
500 W. Wilson Bridge Rd.  
Worthington, Ohio 43085

CONSTITUTION OF THE UNITED STATES

AMENDMENT V--CAPITAL CRIMES; DOUBLE  
JEOPARDY; SELF-INCRIMINATION; DUE  
PROCESS; JUST COMPENSATION FOR  
PROPERTY

No person shall be held to answer for a capital, or otherwise infamous crime, unless a presentment or indictment of a Grand Jury, except in cases arising in the land or naval forces, or in the Militia, when in actual service in time of War or public danger; nor shall any person be subject for the same offense to be twice put in jeopardy of life or limb; nor shall be compelled in any criminal case to be a witness against himself, nor be deprived of life, liberty, or property, without due process of law; nor shall private property be taken for public use, without just compensation.

CONSTITUTION OF THE UNITED STATES

AMENDMENT XIV.--CITIZENSHIP; PRIVILEGES AND IMMUNITIES; DUE PROCESS; EQUAL PROTECTION; APPORTIONMENT OF REPRESENTATION; DISQUALIFICATION OF OFFICERS; PUBLIC DEBT; ENFORCEMENT

Section 1. All persons born or naturalized in the United States, and subject to the jurisdiction thereof, are citizens of the United States and of the State wherein they reside. No State shall make or enforce any law which shall abridge the privileges or immunities of citizens of the United States; nor shall any State deprive any person of life, liberty, or property, without due process of law; nor deny to any person within its jurisdiction the equal protection of the laws.

Section 2. Representatives shall be apportioned among the several States according to their respective numbers, counting the whole number of persons in each State, excluding Indians not taxed. But when the right to vote at any election for the choice of electors for President and Vice President of the United States, Representatives in Congress, the Executive and Judicial officers of a State, or the members of the Legislature thereof, is denied to any of the male inhabitants of such State, being twenty-one years of age, and citizens of the United States, or in any way abridged, except for participation in rebellion, or other crime, the basis of representation therein shall be reduced in the proportion which

the number of such male citizens shall bear to the whole number of male citizens twenty-one years of age in such States.

Section 3. No person shall be a Senator or Representative in Congress, or elector of President and Vice President, or hold any office, civil or military, under the United States, or under any State, who, having previously taken an oath, as a member of Congress, or as an officer of the United States, or as a member of any State legislature, or as an executive or judicial officer of any State, to support the Constitution of the United States, shall have engaged in insurrection or rebellion against the same, or given aid or comfort to the enemies thereof. But Congress may by a vote of two-thirds of each House, remove such disability.

Section 4. The validity of the public debt of the United States, authorized by law, including debts incurred for payment of pensions and bounties for services in suppressing insurrection or rebellion, shall not be questioned. But neither the United States nor any State shall assume or pay any debt or obligation incurred in the aid of insurrection or rebellion against the United States, or any claim for the loss or emancipation of any slave; but all such debts, obligations and claims shall be held illegal and void.

Section 5. The Congress shall have power to enforce, by appropriate legislation, the provisions of this article.

28 U.S.C., CHAPTER 81.--STATE COURTS

§1257. State courts; appeal; certiorari

Final judgments or decrees rendered by the highest court of a State in which a decision could be had, may be reviewed by the Supreme Court as follows:

(1) By appeal, where is drawn in question the validity of a treaty or statute of the United States and the decision is against its validity.

(2) By appeal, where is drawn in question the validity of a statute of any state on the ground of its being repugnant to the Constitution, treaties or laws of the United States, and the decision is in favor of its validity.

(3) By writ of certiorari, where the validity of a treaty or statute of the United States is drawn in question or where the validity of a State statute is drawn in question on the ground of its being repugnant to the Constitution, treaties or laws of the United States, or where any title, right, privilege or immunity is specially set up or claimed under the Constitution, treaties or statutes of, or commission held or authority exercised under, the United States.

For the purposes of this section, the term "highest court of a State" includes the District of Columbia Court of Appeals.

STATE OF INDIANA ) IN THE CIRCUIT  
) SS: COURT OF DAVIESS  
COUNTY OF DAVIESS ) COUNTY

Cause No. C76-185

ARTHUR EGGLESTON, ) FILED  
) IN OPEN COURT  
Plaintiff, ) JUN 28 1974  
-vs- )  
R. J. KUNKLE d/b/a ) WILBUR R. PERSHING  
R. J. RESTORATION ) Clerk, Daviess  
COMPANY, ) Circuit Court  
Defendant. )

JUDGMENT

Comes now Arthur Eggleston, by counsel, and having filed herein his Petition for Judgment upon a decision and order of The Industrial Board of Indiana, which said petition is in the words and figures, as follows:

(H.I.)

And the Court, having read and examined said petition and the matters and facts filed therewith and set forth therein and being duly advised in the

premises, NOW FINDS that a certified copy of said decision and order of The Industrial Board of Indiana was duly issued by said board and filed herein; that said petition should be granted; and that judgment should be entered and rendered by this Court in accordance with said decision and order of said industrial board and that notice of said judgment should be given to the parties,

NOW THEREFORE, IT IS ORDERED,  
ADJUDGED AND DECREED, as follows:

1. That the plaintiff herein, Arthur Eggleston, shall recover of and from the defendant herein, R. J. Kunkle, d/b/a R. J. Restoration Company, the sum of \$14,344.18 (including both principal and interest), and the costs of this action assessed in the sum of \$26.00 plus 50¢ certification - total \$26.50, together with interest on said costs

computed at the rate of 8% per annum and with interest so computed and accruing on the sum of \$12,426.00 from the date hereof;

2. That said plaintiff shall recover of and from said defendant the further sum of \$5,073.00, the same to be payable by defendant to plaintiff in equal weekly installments of \$57.00 each for 89 weeks beginning July 1, 1974, together with interest computed at the rate of 8% per annum upon all such installments remaining unpaid from time to time; and

3. That the sums to be recovered by plaintiff hereunder shall be paid direct to plaintiff except for attorney fees in the sum of \$2,117.40 which shall be paid by defendant direct to plaintiff's attorney, James E. Sandifer, together with interest computed at the

rate of 8% per annum and accruing on said sum of \$2,117.40 from and after December 23, 1973, and defendant shall credit against the sums due plaintiff from defendant under this judgment for all sums paid out as attorney fees to said James E. Sandifer.

4. The Clerk of this Court shall give notice of this judgment to the defendant by depositing a copy thereof in the U. S. post office addressed to him, with postage prepaid, as follows:

R. J. Kunkle d/b/a  
R. J. Restoration Company  
Box 463  
Worthington, Ohio 43085

and comes now such Clerk and certifies that such notice is so given to defendant contemporaneously herewith.

Dated 6/28/74

/s/ James R. Arthur  
Judge, Circuit Court  
of Daviess County,  
Indiana

STATE OF INDIANA  
COUNTY OF DAVIESS SS:

CERTIFICATE

I, WILBUR R. PERSHING, CLERK OF DAVIESS CIRCUIT COURT, DAVIESS COUNTY, INDIANA, DO HEREBY CERTIFY THAT THE FOREGOING IS TRUE AND COMPLFTE COPY OF Judgment -- Book J-9 Page 47 HAD IN SAID CAUSE AND ENTERED ON THE RECORDEDS THEREOF. IN WITNESS WHEREOF, I HEREUNTO SUBSCRIBE MY NAME AND AFFIX THE SEAL OF SAID COURT THIS 28 DAY OF JUNE 1974

/s/ Wilbur R. Pershing  
CLERK DAVIESS CIRCUIT  
COURT

COURT OF COMMON PLEAS,  
FRANKLIN COUNTY, OHIO

Arthur Eggleston :

Plaintiff :

vs. : Case No.  
76CV-10-4013

R. J. Kunkle, dba  
R. J. Restoration Co.:

Defendant :

DECISION AND JUDGMENT ENTRY

Rendered this 11 day of January,  
1977.

RADER, J.

This cause having been come on for trial before the Court and the Court under even date herewith having rendered its Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, verdict and judgment are hereby rendered in favor of plaintiff and against defendant in the sum of \$14,344.18, together with (Daviess County, Indiana) costs in the amount of \$26.50 with interest on said sum at the

rate of 8% per annum from June 28, 1974; plaintiff is further awarded the judgment against defendant in the sum of \$5,073.00 to be payable by defendant to plaintiff in equal weekly installments of \$57.00 for 80 weeks together with interest computed at the rate of 8% per annum upon all such installments remaining unpaid from time to time, and defendant is ordered to pay the costs of this action.

/s/ Rader  
Clifford E. Rader,  
Judge

COPY TO:

R. Jeffrey Schmidt, Attorney for Plaintiff  
E. Bruce Hadden, Attorney for Defendant

COURT OF COMMON PLEAS,  
FRANKLIN COUNTY, OHIO

Arthur Eggleston :

Plaintiff :

vs. : Case No.  
74CV-10-4013

R. J. Kunkle, dba :

R. J. Restoration Co.:

Defendant :

Rendered this 11 day of January,  
1977.

RADER, J.

FINDINGS OF FACT

1. In September 1969, plaintiff Eggleston was hired by defendant R. J. Kunkle, an individual d.b.a. R. J. Restoration Co., to work as a sand blaster in restoring churches located in Indiana. There was no written agreement, but Eggleston was to travel from his home in Marion, Ohio to the work sites in Indiana on Monday mornings, and he resided there until Friday when he

would return home for the weekend.

2. For the next two months Eggleston worked on at least four buildings, each comprising an entirely separate job and all being in Indiana, where he received a serious eye injury on October 22, 1969.

3. Defendant had no insurance and the Company soon went out of business.

4. Plaintiff filed a claim with the Industrial Board of Indiana, his claim was processed, defendant was notified and made several (sic) personal appearances before the Board, and the Industrial Board ruled that it did have jurisdiction and that a compensable injury had occurred. It made an award to plaintiff for his loss of vision and loss of wages.

5. Eggleston filed a certified copy of the Industrial Board's award in

Circuit Court of Daviess county, where the accident occurred, and such Court awarded judgment for him.

6. Eggleston has now filed a certified copy of the Circuit Court's judgment in the Common Pleas Court of Franklin County, wherein defendant resides.

CONCLUSIONS OF LAW

1. This is an Indiana contract.

2. Defendant is an Indiana employer.

3. Plaintiff is an Indiana employee.

4. The Indiana Industrial Board and Circuit Court did have jurisdiction.

5. Plaintiff is entitled to enforce the judgment of the Circuit Court of Davies (sic) County, Indiana in the Court of Common Pleas of Franklin County.

6. Section 40 - 1701 (a) in 1969 defined "employer" as follows:

"'Employer' shall include\*\*any individual using the services of another for pay.\*\*"

7. The residence of the employer outside the state of Indiana does not prevent such employer from being an Indiana employer.

8. By 1963 amendment, Indiana changes its law to include a presumption that all employers have agreed to be bound by the provisions of the Workmen's Compensation Act unless special notice was filed with the Indiana Industrial Board.

9. Since no exemption was ever filed by defendant, it must be presumed that he accepted the provisions of the Indiana Workmen's Compensation Act when he entered into Indiana to do business there.

10. The Court finds that the plaintiff was an Indiana employee, although it is not necessary, in the Court's opinion, to do so.

11. An employment entered into in Ohio in contemplation of performance solely in Indiana leads the Court to the conclusion that this is an Indiana contract of employment.

12. There is a presumption of validity attaching to the Indiana Circuit Court judgment.

13. There were sufficient facts for the Industrial Board of Indiana to take jurisdiction in this case and to make its award.

/s/ Clifford E. Rader  
Clifford E. Rader  
Judge

COPY TO:

R. Jeffrey Schmidt  
Attorney for Plaintiff  
E. Bruce Hadden  
Attorney for Defendant

IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF  
FRANKLIN COUNTY, OHIO

Arthur Eggleston, :

Plaintiff-Appellee, :

v. : No. 77AP-102

R. J. Kunkle, dba :  
R. J. Restoration  
Company,

Defendant-Appellant.:  
\_\_\_\_\_  
DECISION

Rendered on June 9, 1977

CRABBE, BROWN, JONES,  
POTTS & SCHMIDT,  
MR. R. JEFFREY SCHMIDT,  
42 East Gay Street  
Columbus, Ohio 43215,  
and  
MR. THOMAS TRIPP,  
165 North High Street  
Columbus, Ohio 43215,  
For Plaintiff-Appellee.

CAMPBELL & HADDEN,  
MR. E. BRUCE HADDEN, and  
MR. J. DAVID HARRIS, of Counsel,  
500 West Wilson Bridge Road  
Worthington, Ohio 43085,  
For Defendant-Appellant.  
\_\_\_\_\_  
- 30 -

STRAUSBAUGH, P. J.

This is an appeal by defendant from a judgment in the Common Pleas Court of plaintiff.

The record reveals that the action was commenced in the Common Pleas Court based upon a judgment rendered in favor of plaintiff and against defendant in the Circuit Court of Daviess County, Indiana, a certified copy of the judgment being attached to the plaintiff's complaint; that defendant thereafter filed an answer to plaintiff's complaint. The following is defendant's pre-trial statement of the questions of law and legal issues:

"1. Did the Indiana Bureau of Workmen's Compensation have jurisdiction over an Ohio claimant and an Ohio employer when the Indiana Workmen's Compensation Act provides for 'contract' rather than 'situs' coverage and when the Ohio em-

ployer and the Ohio employee were covered under the Ohio Workmen's Compensation Act?

- "2. The basis of the Indiana Bureau of Workmen's Compensation jurisdiction over the Ohio employer.
- "3. The basis of the Indiana District Court's jurisdiction over the Ohio employer.
- "4. The lack of jurisdiction of the Indiana Court to render judgment against an Ohio Defendant.
- "5. Plaintiff failed to file a claim with the Bureau of Workmen's Compensation within the time limited for filing the same."

The case came on for trial on February 17, 1976. The following being the entire transcript of proceedings:

"THE COURT: In the presence of counsel, let the Court fill in a little background. This case is Judge Tyack's case. He apparently is in trial. The case was transferred down to Judge Rader today, on the 17th of February, 1976, and counsel

appearing determined that further evidence was unnecessary; that solely legal questions are involved, and the Defendant, through Mr. Hadden, has today filed a brief. Plaintiffs are granted until March 2nd, 1976, to file their brief. Both of them are trial briefs rather than the one being responsive to the other in any particular order, and that the Court following that will determine the case.

"MR. HADDEN: The only other thing we did have, and I think Plaintiff's counsel has agreed, that the Plaintiff was hired by the Defendant in Ohio, and then went over to Indiana, which gave rise to all of the subsequent proceedings, and we would like the opportunity to file a reply brief, if it is deemed necessary, depending upon which issues are raised by the Plaintiffs.

"(Thereupon, the Court and counsel discussed the dates on which briefs were to be filed.)"

Defendant in his supplemental trial brief states:

"The sole question before this Court is the presence or absence of jurisdiction by the Circuit Court of Daviess County, Indiana

over this defendant when it rendered its alleged judgment which was based upon the certification of an alleged award of Workmen's Compensation benefits by the Industrial Board of Indiana which was certified to that Court and transformed into a judgment of that Court \* \* \*"

Defendant is contending that the plaintiff is not entitled to the full faith and credit of the Indiana judgment because of lack of jurisdiction of the Indiana court. In both defendant's pre-trial statements and his trial brief, defendant contests jurisdiction but not the judgment rendered by the Indiana court. Although the record made by both parties in this case leaves a great deal to be desired, this court finds significance in the omissions in the record and the objections which were not made by the defense in this case. It is apparently conceded that plaintiff was hired by the defendant in Ohio, was injured in

Indiana, and that a judgment was obtained by plaintiff in the Indiana court.

The trial court had before it, and there is in the record, the certified copy of the Indiana Judgment.

The Supreme Court in Symons v. Eichelberger (1924), 110 Ohio St. 224, held:

"1. The courts of the state of Ohio will give full faith and credit to the judicial decrees of courts of record of the District of Columbia. Such decrees are conclusive upon the merits of the controversy therein adjudicated.

" \* \* \*

"3. In an action upon a judgment rendered in a court of record of the District of Columbia, jurisdiction is presumed. The burden of proof of establishing that the court in question had no jurisdiction to render the judgment sued upon rests upon the defendant."

Defendant brings seven assignments of error:

"1. The Trial Court erred in rendering Findings of Fact numbered 1 through 5.

"2. The Trial Court erred in rendering Conclusions of Law numbered 4 (in part), 5 and 12.

"3. The Trial Court erred in taking judicial notice of the judgment purportedly rendered by the Circuit Court of Daviess, Indiana.

"4. The Trial Court erred in granting full faith and credit to the purported judgment entered by the Circuit Court of Daviess County, Indiana.

"5. The Trial Court erred in rendering Conclusions of Law numbered 1, 2, 3, 4 (in part), 6, 7, 8, 9, 10, 11, and 13.

"6. The Trial Court erred in finding that the Plaintiff was an Indiana employee and that the Defendant was an Indiana employer.

"7. The judgment of the Trial Court is against the manifest weight of the evidence and contrary to law."

We find that there was no prejudi-

cial error on the part of the trial court in rendering the judgment in favor of plaintiff and against defendant and in rendering its findings of fact and conclusions of law. We further find that the judgment of the trial court is not against the manifest weight of the evidence and contrary to law. For the foregoing reasons all of defendant's assignments of error must be and, therefore, are overruled, and the judgment is affirmed.

Judgment affirmed.

HOLMES and REILLY, JJ., concur.

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IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF  
FRANKLIN COUNTY, OHIO

Arthur Eggleston, :  
Plaintiff-Appellee,  
v. : No. 77AP-102  
R. J. Kunkle, dba :  
R. J. Restoration  
Company,  
Defendant-Appellant.:  

---

D E C I S I O N

Rendered on August 4, 1977

CRABBE, BROWN, JONES,  
POTTS & SCHMIDT,  
MR. R. JEFFREY SCHMIDT,  
42 East Gay Street  
Columbus, Ohio 43215,  
and

MR. THOMAS TRIPP,  
165 North High Street,  
Columbus, Ohio 43215,  
For Plaintiff-Appellee.

CAMPBELL & HADDEN  
MR. E. BRUCE HADDEN, and  
MR. J. DAVID HARRIS, of Counsel,  
500 West Wilson Bridge Road  
Worthington, Ohio 43085,  
For Defendant-Appellant.  

---

STRAUSBAUGH, P. J.

Defendant-appellant moves this court to reconsider its decision of June 9, 1977, or in the alternative to certify this case as being in conflict with decisions issued by other appellate districts.

The gravamen of appellant's motion is that the trial judge considered while making his decision the judgment of the Circuit Court of Davies County, Indiana, which was not offered into evidence in the trial court. However, the plaintiff attached a copy of the Indiana decision to his complaint. Defendant from the moment this lawsuit began was aware that plaintiff was pinning his entire case on the Indiana judgment. In defendant's trial brief, defendant says that, "The sole question before this Court is the person in the presence or absence of

jurisdiction by the Circuit Court of Davies County over this defendant \* \* \* Further on in his trial brief, defendant quotes from the decision of the Industrial Board of Indiana, whose decision was upheld by the Circuit Court of Davies County.

There is no doubt that defendant at all times after the commencement of this action in the Common Pleas Court was aware of the Indiana judgment. The defendant asserts that the trial court's use and reliance on the Indiana decision was unfair and contrary to law. This assertion is not timely. Defendant knew that the trial judge was considering the judgment of the Indiana Court. The record indicates that judgment is the only evidence the trial court had before it to consider, yet defendant failed to object. Defendant could have objected

to the use of the Indiana judgment by the trial court, but perhaps realized that as a practical matter all plaintiff would have to have done was move to have the judgment admitted into evidence.

Regardless we will not now overturn the trial court's decision as defendant knew of and failed to object to the reliance of the trial court on the Indiana judgment.

Defendant asks this court to certify this case as being in conflict with State v. Snowden (1976), 49 Ohio App. 2d 7. Snowden, supra, applied Civ. R. 44(A)(1), which is the rule for authentication of judgments of other states.

Civ. R. 44(A)(1) states that:

"An official record, or an entry therein, kept within a state or within the United States or within a territory or other jurisdiction of the United States, when admissible for any purpose, may be evidenced by an official

publication thereof or by a copy attested by the officer having the legal custody of the record, or by his deputy, and accompanied by a certificate that such officer has the custody. The certificate may be made by a judge of a court of record in which the record is kept or may be made by any public officer having a seal of office and having official duties in the political subdivision in which the record is kept, authenticated by the seal of his office."

Defendant alleges the officer having legal custody of the original document did not certify that he had custody of the document. State v. Snowden, supra, held that if the official record is not accompanied by a certificate that such officer has the custody, then the evidence is inadmissible. We have not reached this issue, because we have held that defendant knew the trial judge was using the Indiana judgment to make his decision and did not object,

thus waiving his right to complain. We reiterate, defendant should have voiced these objections during the proceedings. Thus, we find this case not in conflict with Snowden, supra.

This case is also not in conflict with Toledo Trust Co. v. National Bank of Detroit (1976), 50 Ohio App. 2d 147. In Toledo Trust Co., supra, the judgment of a Michigan Probate Court was not granted full faith and credit on the grounds Michigan had no jurisdiction over one of the parties. This court agrees with the proposition of law propounded in Toledo Trust Co., supra, that a judgment of a court of a sister state is not entitled to full faith and credit unless the court has jurisdiction of the subject matter and the person who is a party. However, in the instant case, defendant who is challenging the juris-

diction of the Indiana court, has the burden of establishing that the Indiana court did not have jurisdiction to render the judgment. Symons v. Eichelberger (1924), 110 Ohio St. 224. Defendant did not meet that burden. Therefore, this motion for certification of conflict is also overruled.

We find no merit in defendant's motion for reconsideration, nor any merit in defendant's motion for certification of conflict. Therefore, all motions are overruled.

Motions overruled.

HOLMES and REILLY, JJ., concur.

THE SUPREME COURT OF OHIO

THE STATE OF OHIO, ) 1977 TERM  
 )  
City of Columbus. ) To wit: September  
 ) 29, 1977  
Arthur Eggleston, )  
Appellee, )  
 )  
vs. ) APPEAL FROM THE  
 ) COURT OF APPEALS  
R. J. Kunkle, d.b.a. )  
R. J. Restoration ) for Franklin  
Co., ) County  
Appellant. )

This cause, here on appeal as of right from the Court of Appeals for Franklin County, was heard in the manner prescribed by law, and, no motion to dismiss such appeal having been filed, the Court sua sponte dismisses the appeal for the reason that no substantial constitutional question exists herein.

It is further ordered that a copy of this entry be certified to the Clerk of the Court of Appeals for Franklin

County for entry.

I, Thomas L. Startzman, Clerk of the Supreme Court of Ohio, certify that the foregoing entry was correctly copied from the Journal of this Court.

Witness my hand and the seal of the Court this

\_\_\_\_ day of \_\_\_\_ 19\_\_\_\_

\_\_\_\_ Clerk

\_\_\_\_ Deputy

CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE

I hereby certify that a copy of  
the foregoing Petition for a Writ of  
Certiorari was served on R. Jeffrey  
Schmidt, Esq., 42 East Gay Street,  
Columbus, Ohio 43215, and on Thomas  
Tripp, Esq., 165 North High Street,  
Columbus, Ohio 43215, Attorneys for  
Respondent, by U. S. Mail, postage  
prepaid, this 28<sup>th</sup> day of December,  
1977.

  
E. Bruce Hadden